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A Government Lawyer
Comments on the Davis Treatise
Earl W. Kintner*
I am pleased and grateful for the opportunity to review Profes-
sor Davis's Administrative Law Treatise. His stature, ability and
prior performance made it easy to predict before its publication
that this work would dominate the field. The actuality is no dis-
appointment. It is not an exaggeration to say that the publication
of this treatise is one of the truly monumental events of this genera-
tion of legal writing.
As the chief legal officer of an agency dealing with the day-to-
day grist of the administrative process, I have made constant use
of the one-volume Davis on Administrative Law published in 1951.
That excellent work was the first comprehensive treatment of
this subject in the literature. The present work, which considerably
expands the earlier edition,' is the culmination of seventeen years
preparation and the crowning achievement to date of a careful and
conscientious but daring and imaginative scholar.
That is not to say, however, that the Treatise is in any sense a
"definitive" statement of the law. Far from it. As Professor Davis
recognizes, "administrative law at its present stage of development
is probably as unruly as any other major segment of law."2 This is
in part owing to its relatively late development and the reluctance
of the legal profession to recognize it as a category, and in part
to the paucity until recent years of theoretical writing in the field.
Because of the unruly subject matter, this treatise is by no means a
hornbook setting forth the black letter principles of the law. It is
much more. For those areas in which the law is more or less set-
fled, the existing rules are clearly described and adequately an-
* General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission; Vice-Chairman, Administrative
Law Section, American Bar Association. The views expressed herein are those of the
author and are not intended to reflect those of the Federal Trade Commission, or
those of the associations of which the author is a member.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Carleton A. Harkradcr,
Appellate Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, and Edwin S. Rockefeller, Assist-
ant to the General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, in the preparation of this
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1. The new treatise consists of four volumes, thirty chapters, 385 sections, 2,555
pages. The old was one volume, twenty chapters, 257 sections, 1,024 pages.
2. Preface to DAVIs, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TuE ArsE at iv (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAvis].
DAVIS TREATISE
notated. Where the law is less clear, available judicial opinions
and other legal materials are employed in "the creative construc-
tion of principles."3 Finally, there is a considerable No Man's Land
in which the author's major function has been "digging out and
organizing the problems, presenting such law as is susceptible of
summary, discussing pros and cons, and attempting to make con-
tributions to the solution of the problems of law making."4 To this
task he brings vast experience, a gift for penetrating analysis and
a powerful writing style. The result is a work that will exert an im-
portant influence upon the future development of administrative
law.
Various categories of users will profit from the treatise. For
teachers and students of law it contains much challenging material
that should enliven classroom discussion. Especially helpful will
be the careful analysis of conflicting cases, suggestions of possible
alternative solutions for unsettled problems and the author's analy-
sis of relevant policy considerations. Judges and practitioners will
additionally profit from the excellent research aids contined in vol-
ume 4: exhaustive tables of cases and of authorities, a 124-page
section of procedural forms for use in pleading before six typical
agencies and the federal courts, and a competently-prepared index.
All of those features combine to make the treatise an indispensable
tool for lawyers employed by administrative agencies and for law-
yers employed for representation before administrative agencies.
Professor Davis is a convinced and convincing advocate of the
administrative process. Throughout the text he identifies imper-
fections and uncertainties, but never does he leave the slightest
doubt of his fundamental confidence in the role of the administra-
tive agency as the pre-eminent operational instrument of modem
government. Citing the remarkable growth of the administrative
process on both the federal and state levels, he notes that the im-
petus did not come from "philosophers or theorists" but from
"down-to-earth men who were seeking workable machinery for
stamping out particular evils."5 The traditional legislative and judi-
cial processes were unable to cope with the many new govern-
mental tasks demanded by social, political and economic pressures
of a civilization grown vastly more complex than that under which
our tripartite government developed.0 As new needs have arisen,
3. Ibi.
4. id.
5. 1 DAVIS § 105, at 35-86.
6. The legislative process and the judicial process, which are the principal
alternatives to the administrative process, frequently fall far short of providing
what is needed. A legislative bdy is at its best in determining the direction of
major policy, and in checking and supervising administration. It is ill-suited for
handling masses of detail, or for applyg to shifting and continuing problems
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new agencies have been created to fill the gaps. These factors, the
author concludes, forecast long-term continued growth of the ad-
ministrative process.
I
The first chapter is a sparkling exposition and defense of the
administrative process. The remainder of the Treatise exhaustively
covers the entire field of administrative law. Some theoretical-con-
stitutional questions occupy less space than miht be anticipated.
"Supremacy of law" and "separation of powers' doctrines are dis-
cussed relatively briefly in the early part of the Treatise, and "dele-
gation" is covered in a single chapter. In contrast, the major por-
tion of the Treatise is devoted to the functioning of the agencies
themselves and problems arising in the exercise of those functions. 7
The Administrative Procedure Act is not handled as a separate
topic, but applicable portions are discussed in functional context.
Consideration of the knotty problems of judicial review of admin-
istrative action and tort liability of administrative bodies and of-
ficers occupies the latter part of the Treatise.8
the ideas supplied by scientists or other professional advisers. Experience early
proved the inability of Congress to prescribe detailed schedules of rates for rail-
roads, or to keep abreast of changing needs concerning the levels of Import
duties. Gradually our legislative bodies developed the system of legislating only
the main outlines of programs requiring constant attention, and leaving to admin-
istrative agencies the tasks of working out subsidiary policies. This system
facilitated not merely the promulgation of law through rules and regulations
but the correlation of rule making with such other necessary activities as
adjudication, investigating, prosecuting, and supervising.
Id. at 37.
As reasons for the development of systems of administrative adjudication, the
author listed (1) convenience because such issues naturally grow out of the admin-
istrative handling of cases; (2) the fact that many issues developed by the process
are outside the area of judicial competence; (3) advantages of agency specialization;
(4) the difficulty of separating adjudication from administration; (5) the belief that
the judicial process is awkward, slow and expensive whereas administrative hearings
are simple and nontechnical; (6) the fact that administrative agencies, unlike courts,
are charged with protecting the public interest even in the absence of a moving
party; and (7) the widespread belief that the conservative biases of judges dis-
qualify them to administer new programs with social objectives that may conflict
with private rights. Id. at 37-44.
7. As an indication of the coverage in this area, these chapters are headed:
3. Investigation; 4. Supervising, Prosecuting, Advising, Declaring and Informally
Adjudicating; 5. Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive Rules; 6. Rule Making;
7. Requirement of an Opportunity To Be Heard; 8. Adjudication Procedure; 9. Sub-
delegation of Power; 10. Examiners; 11. Institutional Decisions; 12. Bias; 13. Separa-
tion of Functions; 14. Evidence; 15. Official Notice; 16. Findings, Reasons, and
Opinions; 17. Estoppel and Stare Decisis; 18. Res Judicata.
8. These chapters are headed: 19. Primary Jurisdiction; 20. Exhaustion of Ad-
ministrative Remedies; 21. Ripeness for Review; 22. Standing; 23. Federal Forms
of Proceedings for Review; 24. State Forms of Proceedings for Review; 25. Tort
Liability of Governmental Units; 26. Officers' Tort Liability; 27. Suits Against
Officers for Relief Other Than Damages; 28. Unreviewable Administrative Action;
29. Scope of Review of Evidence; 30. Scope of Review of Application of Legal
Concept to Facts.
DAVIS TREATISE
Professor Davis's organization and emphasis favor the practical
over the theoretical, but his scholarship is nonetheless consistent
and thorough. The treatment of delegation of legislative power to
administrative agencies is a case in point In a marvelously pithy
section called "Federal Delegation Law in a Nutshell,"9 he sums
up the subject in thirty-two lines, concluding with the observation
that "In absence of palpable abuse or true congressional abdica-
tion, the nondelegation doctrine to which the Supreme Court has
in the past often paid lip service is without practical force."" He
then vindicates his scholarship with an exhaustive chapter," replete
with documentation and analysis, in which he views the history,
problems and policy conflicts of both state and federal delegation.
The two concluding sections of that chapter are a critique of non-
delegation doctrine in state courts (which Professor Davis sug-
gests have been much more sticky than federal courts about dele-
gation, writing opinions about the need for "standards" when the
real need is for safeguards against arbitrariness) 12 and, in the
federal area, an inquiry into desirable criteria for congessional
delegation of policy-making power (the author believes tat dele-
gation with few statutory controls, followed by continuing super-
vision by means of investigations and required reports would pro-
vide desirable safeguards while promoting effective use of ad-
ministrative techniques in case-to-case development of princi-
ples). 3
Two of the most interesting and significant chapters deal with
institutional decisions' 4 and official notice. 5 These two topics are
intimately related and, taken together, perhaps the most distinctive
features of administrative adjudication. Notwithstanding their ad-
vantages from the point of view of efficiency, these techniques
present difficult problems of procedural fairness such, for example,
as (1) whether agency heads may consult with staff members in
making decisions and, if so, with which ones, and (2) to what
extent a party may meet and contest matter which has been official-
ly noticed. Professor Davis has carefully sifted the conflicting judi-
cial and legislative materials in these areas and superimposedt upon
them his own analysis of relevant policy considerations. On the
question of consultation by decision makers, he seems to approve
the Administrative Procedure Act solution, which leaves agency
heads free to consult any staff members except those engaged in
9. 1 DAvis § 2.01, at 75.
10. Id. at 76.
11. 1 DAviS, Delegation of Power ch. 2.
12. Id. § 2.15, at 148.
13. Id. § 2.16, at 152.
14. Id. ch. 11.
15. Id. ch. 15.
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investigating and prosecuting. Professor Davis is more enthusiastic,
however, about the solution to the official notice problem provided
in section 7(d) of the APA: "Where any agency decision rests on
official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in
the record, any party shall on timely request be afforded an oppor-
tunity to show the contrary." He regards it as preferable to the
position of the American Law Institute that facts may not be no-
ticed unless they are indisputable or are contained in sources of
indisputable accuracy. Professor Davis also regards the APA solu-
tion as superior to the recommendation of the Second Hoover Com-
mission,16 which would place the burden upon the agency to pro-
vide parties an opportunity to rebut officially noticed facts. The
concern in both areas is to maintain acceptable standards of fair-
ness without sacrificing the peculiar advantages of the adminis-
trative method.
Professor Davis recognizes that the power of investigation is
vital to an administrative agency; that an agency must be empow-
ered to obtain relevant data not only for law enforcement purposes,
but also for other purposes such as the formation of policy and the
supervision of compliance with orders; that compulsory process is
essential; and that the effectiveness of such process depends ulti-
mately upon judicial enforcement. Commenting in 1924 upon the
statutory power of the Federal Trade Commission to investigate a
corporation, the Supreme Court stated:
Anyone who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the Fourth Amend-
ment would be loath to believe that Congress intended to authorize
one of its subordinate agencies to sweep all our traditions into the fire
[citation] and to direct fishing expeditions into private papers on the
possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime.' 7
But, speaking in 1950 of the same power of the same agency, it
said:
Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as
caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing
agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate be-
havior is consistent with the law and the public interest.'8
The dramatic difference in attitude reflected by those two judi-
cial utterances epitomizes the development of the administrative
power of investigation, an area in which modern decisions have
now settled most of the important legal questions. The history and
significance of that development is covered in the chapter on in-
16. CO INI'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXEcurvE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT,
TASK FonCE REPORT OF LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 199, 201 (Recommenda-
tion No. 47, 1955).
17. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1924).
18. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 228 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
[Vol. 43: 620
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vestigations.19 The concluding paragraph is a fine example of the
author's penetrating style and ability to summarize a complex sit-
uation in a few words:
But a better understanding of the significance of what has happened
emphasizes the inevitability. Each step follows inexorably: Industrializa-
tion brings regulation. Regulation necessitates administrative processes.
Agencies cannot operate without access to facts. Ideas about privacy,
standing in the way of agencies which seek information indispensable to
intelligent regulation, have to give way. In the same way that the gaso-
line engine made inevitable the development of the airplane, mass pro-
duction methods and all they symbolize produce complex business ar-
rangements which bring forth equally intricate governmental mechanisms
requiring effective exercise of the administrative power of investigation.
And the courts as a result feel called upon to write out of the Constitu-
tion the protections that the courts at an earlier time felt called upon to
write into the Constitution.20
II
The preface of the Treatise and, by implication, much of the
text are concerned with the problem of law development. Although
one of the reviewers of his 1951 volume concluded that "the period
of synthesis and systematization is now at hand,"- I Professor Davis
does not agree. Before a systematic statement of principles is pos-
sible there must be "a good deal more interaction of imagination
and experience, a longer period of case-to-case development, more
evolution through trial-and-error methods."-- He rightly recognizes
that the United States Supreme Court, which spends one-third of
its time reviewing administrative action, must be the main instru-
ment for the development, and he expresses serious doubts that
it is measuring up to its responsibility in this respect.
Somewhat regretfully,s and with careful qualifications, the au-
thor refers to the Court's decisions on problems of joinder of su-
perior officers, exhaustion of administrative remedy and ripeness
for judicial review. He points out opinions that ignore the real prob-
lem presented,24 or contain misleading generalizations,s or do not
19. 1 DAVIS ch. 3.
20. Id. § 3.14, at 231--32.
21. Schwartz, Book Review, 18 BaooxLYN L. REv. 148, 149 (1951).
22. Preface to DAvIs at iv.
23. One hesitates to criticize the Supreme Court at this time,,because most
recent criticism of the Court has been unfortunate, and because the Court's
total performance in recent decades may well deserve admiration rather than
attack. Furthermore, we must remind ourselves that the Justices are not super-
human, that the Court's business is sifted to emphasize the most perplexing
problems in many diversified areas of lawr and goverment, and that the case
load seldom allows the Court to restudy whole bodies of laxv in perspective.
Id. at v.
24. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), which is dis-
cussed in 3 DAVIS § 21.06, as a case which presents, but ignores, a ripeness problem.
25. See, e.g., Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151, 164 (1957),
1959]
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even attempt to explain contradictory holdings.2" His conclusion is
that in many areas the Court has failed to Produce a coherent body
of principles, sometimes seeming to act 'without any regard for
the needs of law development."27
The Supreme Court would be more useful and effective in this
important area, he suggests, if it would adopt these five construc-
tive suggestions:
(1) The Court probably should write fewer general essays in its opin-
ions and it should give more meticulous care to the ones it does write.
(2) The Court should take greater advantage of the values of case-
to-case development of law. (3) The Court should make further effort
to reduce the frequency of contradictory holdings, and it should check
its apparently growing tendency to indulge in easy generalizations that
are misleading if read literally. (4) The Court should have greater
respect for its own holdings and for its own opinions; without restricting
its freedom to overrule, it should restrict its freedom to violate its own
doctrine. (5) The Court should inquire whether it is often too light-
hearted about the manipulation of technical doctrine in order to produce
desired substantive results in particular cases.28
Those suggestions were made with deference to the difficulty
of the Supreme Court's job, the pressure of its case load, and the
desirability of maintaining enough flexibility to "manipulate doc-
trine" to fit particular cases. In spite of the qualifications, however,
it seems to me that the criticism should be balanced by some posi-
tive factors. Specifically, the criticism failed to recognize that the
Supreme Court has acted to clarify other administrative law ques-
tions with a sure sense of the problems involved and has arrived
at intelligible and lasting solutions.
Particular examples are two recent cases which I had the privi-
lege of arguing before the Supreme Court. One involved the scope
of the Federal Trade Commission's discretion in fashioning its
cease and desist orders at the conclusion of adjudicative proceed-
ings; the other concerned the resulting effects of such orders. In
deciding each of these cases, the Supreme Court displayed a keen
awareness of the underlying problem and produced a result that
eliminated existing uncertainty and substantially contributed to the
development of sound doctrine.
which generalizes that "so long as there is warrant in the record [a rational basis]
for the judgment of the expert body it must stand." The Treatise at 4 DAVIs §
30.05 cites other general statements to the same effect, but at § 80.06 it discusses
other holdings in which the Supreme Court has ignored such general statements
and substituted the Court's judgment for that of the administrative body.
26. See id. § 30.07, which considers the Supreme Court's failure to explain its
contradictory holdings on whether to use the "rational basis" or the "substitution
of judgment" test in reviewing the agency's application of the law to undisputed
facts.
27. Preface to DAvis at ix.
28. Id. at v.
[Vol. 43 :620
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The Commission's order in the National Lead case not only pro-
hibited agreements or conspiracies among respondents of the sort
that had resulted in price fixing, but further prohibited each in-
dividually to use a zone delivered price system "for the purpose
or with the effect of systematically matching the delivered price
quotations or the delivered prices of other sellers...." 29 On review
the Court of Appeals set aside the quoted portion of the order on
the grounds that the illegality of the zone system had not been
determined in this proceeding.30 Thus, the questions presented to
the Supreme Court were what constitutes a permissible relation-
ship between the prohibition and the practices found to be illegal
and to what extent Commision remedies are subject to modification
on review.
The Commission argued3I that not only did its prohibition bear
a reasonable relationship to the unlawful practices found to exist,
but that in the Commission's exercise of "allowable judgment" this
prohibition was necessary as a means of bringing about individual
pricing policies that would not amount to a legal perpetuation of
the past illegal price system. The Commission further contended
that its judgment in any determination of this nature must be
based not only on the facts of the particular case, but also on
considerations derived from past experience in effecting or enforc-
ing compliance with orders aimed at eliminating such conspiracies.
In addition, it was pointed out that the particular prohibition was
only temporary in nature, its duration depending upon how quick-
ly the effects of the conspiracy were eliminated.
The Supreme Court reinstated the Commission's order, and re-
affirmed the Commission's responsibility to fashion orders which
would effectively "close all roads to the prohibited goal." 2 The
Court held that the remedy selected had a reasonable relation-
ship to the unlawful practices. It concluded that
• . . under the circumstances here, the Commission was justified in its
determination that it was necessary to include some restraint in its order
against the individual corporations in order to prevent a continuance of
the unfair competitive practices found to exist.33
The scope of the Commission's discretion in fashioning orders
for particular situations was raised again in the Niehoff case.34 Nie-
hoff contended throughout the proceeding that if an order were
29. National Lead Co., 49 F.T.C. 791, 873 (1953).
30. National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825, 843-44 (7th Cir. 1955), citing
Salt Producers Ass'n v. FTC, 134 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1943). See also Milk & Ice
Cream Can Institute v. FTC, 152 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1946).
31. See 25 U.S.L. W=r 3181 (U.S. Dec. 18, 1956).
32. FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
33. Id. at 430.
34. C. E. Niehoff & Co., 51 F.T.C. 1114 (1955).
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issued against it before similar orders were issued against its com-
petitors, its business would suffer economic extinction. The Com-
mission rejected Niehoff's plea that the order be held in abeyance
pending action against the competitors, stating in part:
That respondent's business may be adversely affected by the requirement
to cease its unlawful conduct does not counter-balance the precedent
which would be set by the requested action which, if followed, would
mean that Commission orders would be forever pending and unlawful
practices rarely, if ever, corrected.3 5
The Court of Appeals stated that because the Commission had
not exercised its permissive power to delay or postpone compli-
ance with its orders, the court itself would consider the effect of
the order upon Niehoff in light of equitable principles and, ac-
cordingly, modified the Commission's order to take "effect at such
time in the future as the. . . Court of Appeals ... may direct .... ,,"
Before the Supreme Court, the Commission contended that the
particular circumstances in the automotive replacement parts in-
dustry made it impossible to enforce the applicable statute in the
manner proposed by Niehoff and directed by the court below, and
that it was solely within the discretion of the Commission to de-
cide against whom it would proceed. 7
In its opinion, reversing the court below and affirming the Com-
mission's order in its entirety, the Supreme Court stated:
In view of the scope of administrative discretion that Congress has given
the Federal Trade Commission, it is ordinarily not for courts to modify
ancillary features of a valid Commission order. This is but recognition
of the fact that in the shaping of its remedies within the framework of
regulatory legislation, an agency is called upon to exercise its special-
ized, experienced judgment .... [T]he Commission alone is empowered
to develop that enforcement policy best calculated to achieve the ends
contemplated by Congress .... If the Commission has decided the ques-
tion, its discretionary determination should not be overturned in the ab-
sence of a patent abuse of discretion."8
National Lead and Niehoff establish the principle that proper
exercise of administrative discretion to decide the scope and effect
of orders to cease and desist may include a consideration of practi-
cal factors essential to the effective administration of orders after
their issuance. That, I submit, is a solid contribution by the Su-
preme Court to the development of administrative law and to the
effectiveness of the administrative process.
35. Id. at 1153.
36. C. E. Niehoff & Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 37, 43 (7th Cir. 1957).
37. See 26 U.S.L. W= 3209 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1958). The Niehoff case was argued
along with Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC (No. 77).
38. Moog Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413-14 (1958).
[Vol. 4 : 620
DAVIS TREATISE
m
In 1940, a student of administrative law said:
From the very beginning the administrative tribunal has faced the
hostility of the legal profession. ...The administrative tribunal ... is
often pentrating into new fields where precedents do not exist. Its con-
cem is with the future more than with the past, and it counts the proba-
ble progeny of its decisions as of more importance than their ancestry.
. . . Those who dislike such activities of the government as regulation
of the utility holding companies, of labor relations, or of the marketing
of securities, rightly conceive that if they can destroy the administrative
tribunal which enforces regulation, they would destroy the whole plan of
regulation itself.3 9
In 1956 the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion adopted a resolution on specialized courts, recommending,
among other things, that certain "judicial functions of the Federal
Trade Commission be transferred to a specialized court under the
Judicial Branch of the Government 40 In 1958 a bill 41 was intro-
duced in the Senate "To amend Title 28 of the United States Code,
'Judiciary and Judicial Procedure," and incorporate therein provi-
sions relating to the United States Trade Court, and for other pur-
poses." The bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary
but no hearings were held during the 85th Congress. An identical
bill 4 has been introduced in the 86th Congress.
This bill would create a trade court composed of five judges to
hold office during good behavior, and declares that the court shall
be "a court established under Article IMl of the Constitution of the
United States." Provision is made for temporary assignment of
any district judge of the United States to serve as a judge of the
trade court. The Court is authorized to appoint "not more than 15
Commissioners who shall be subject to removal by the court." The
39. Jackson, The Administrative Process, 5 J. Soc. PmL. 143, 146-47 (1940).
40. The resolution reads as follows:
SPECIALIZED COURTS. RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association
recommends to the Congress the establishment, by amendment of Title 28 of
the United States Code, of one or more courts of special jurisdiction within
and as part of the judicial branch of the government, such courts to have origi-
nal jurisdiction in specified cases to ensure the tradition of independence in areas
presently subject to administrative action equivalent to judicial action in courts
of general jurisdiction, and their final orders and judgments to be subject to
review by the Courts of Appeals; and that there be transferred to divisions of a
single such court or to several such courts:
(a) Limited jurisdiction in the trade practice field with respect to certain
powers now vested in the Federal Trade Commission and in certain other agencies.
(b) The jurisdiction now vested in the National Labor Relations Board over
the adjudication of representation and unfair labor practice cases.
(c) Such other adjudicatory functions as the Congress may from time to time
determine.
41. S. 3798, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
42. S. 1275, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
1959]
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bill provides that "the rules of evidence applied in the District
Courts in civil actions tried without a jury shall be applied in
trials and proceedings of the Trade Court and its commissioners."
Courts of Appeals are given jurisdiction to review decisions of the
trade court "in the same manner and to the same extent as deci-
sions of the District Courts in civil actions tried without a jury."
The trade court would be given
exclusive jurisdiction to hear proceedings, render judgments, and issue
decrees and orders under the following statutes:
(1) Section 11 of the Clayton Act...
(2) Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act .
(3) Section 6(a) of the Wool Products Labeling Act ...
(4) Section 8(a) of the Fur Products Labeling Act ...
(5) Sections 5(a) and (b) of the Flammable Fabrics Act ...
(6) Section 411 of the Civil Aeronautics Act ...
(7) Sections 203, 204 and 205 of the Packers and Stockyards Act....
The bill would amend the present statutes to provide that the
Federal Trade Commission may institute proceedings by petition
in the trade court.
Professor Davis, with the aid of careful scholarship and academic
detachment places these recent proposals in proper perspective
and demonstrates that there is a close relationship between Mr.
Justice Jackson's analysis in 1940 and the American Bar Associa-
tion's action in 1956 with the resulting trade court bill in the pres-
ent Congress. This Treatise makes a particularly important con-
tribution at a time when the administrative agencies are under fire
from many directions. 43 At this important point in the development
of the administrative process, this Treatise deserves careful con-
sideration by all those concerned with administrative law. Professor
Davis demonstrates for all who have the objectivity to look deeper
than emotion-charged cliches, the lack of merit and futility of
proposals to dismember the administrative process. I say lack of
merit and futility to accomplish the stated objectives of those mak-
ing the proposals. The trade court bill, if adopted, might very well
aid, as Mr. Justice Jackson suggested, in destroying effective trade
regulation.
Professor Davis demonstrates carefully and thoroughly what he
terms "the cardinal observation" that "administration and adjudica-
tion run into each other in such a way that they are often insep-
arable. . . . " This observation from a distinguished student and
teacher is completely consistent with my own shirt-sleeve experi-
43. See, e.g., ScmVAT'rz, THE PROFESSOR AND TiE COMMISSIONS 271-75 (1959).
See also Lewis, To Regulate the Regulators, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1959 (Magazine),
p. 13.
44. 1 DAvis § 1.02, at 11.
[Vol. 43: 620
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ence at the Federal Trade Commission. The Commission, over a
.period of many years, has developed a range of administrative
techniques to encourage and enforce compliance with the trade
regulation laws. Where violations appear inadvertent and most
likely never to reoccur, the Commission may decide with a mini-
mum of formality that further proceedings are inappropriate.
Where stronger moral pressure may be needed, the Commission
requires written stipulations that further law violations will not
occur. Many cases seem to call for use of the Commission's statu-
tory complaint and order procedure but can expeditiously be set-
tled by agreements permitting a formal order by consent of the
respondent. The Commission has also developed a procedure for
trade practice conferences looking toward rules for particular in-
dustries which need official assistance in encouraging voluntary
compliance with the trade regulation laws. Behind this range of
administrative techniques, and giving them meaning and authority,
is the Commission's power to issue enforceable cease and desist
orders in contested proceedings. To take away this power would
destroy, in great part, the effectiveness of other techniques by
which the Commission achieves compliance with the trade regula-
tion laws without resort to formal proceedings.45
The trade court bill would withdraw from the Federal Trade
Commission authority to hear and decide cases under various pro-
visions of law. The Commission without power to issue a cease
and desist order would have no power to approve stipulations to
cease and desist It is likely, therefore, that if the proposed trade
court were created, it would find itself faced with several times
as many cases as are now litigated before the Federal Trade Com-
mission.
The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure
in 1941 stated that negotiations and informal settlements consti-
tute -the lifeblood of the administrative process." 4' The following
conclusion of that Committee is equally valid today:
Clearly, amicable disposition of cases is far less likely where negotiations
are with officials devoted solely to prosecution and where the prosecut-
ing officials cannot turn to the deciding branch to discover the law and
the applicable policies.47
Professor Davis finds: "The fundamental reason for resort to
the administrative process is the undertaking by government of
45. Since 1914 more than 9,000 stipulations to cease and desist have been ap-
proved; approximately 5,000 cease and desist orders have been issued by the Com-
mission.





tasks which from a strictly practical standpoint can best be per-
formed through that process." 4 s This statement applies, in my
opinion, with great force to the creation of the Federal Trade Com-
mission.
Effective regulation of trade requires the administrative as well
as the judicial approach. Review of the legislative debate and re-
ports, the comment of students, and the platforms of political par-
ties preceding enactment of the Federal Trade Commission and
Clayton Acts shows that judicial enforcement was not adequate,
even in 1914, to meet the growing problem of trade restraint.
With continued growth of our economy the need for a dual ap-
proach is even greater today. The Supreme Court emphasized this
in the Cement Institute case:
[L]egislative history shows a strong congressional purpose not only to
continue enforcement of the Sherman Act by the Department of Justice
and the federal district courts but also to supplement that enforcement
through the administrative process of the new Trade Commission ...
All of the committee reports and the statements of those in charge of the
Trade Commission Act reveal an abiding purpose to vest both the Com-
mission and the courts with adequate powers to hit at every trade prac-
tice, then existing or thereafter contrived, which restrained competition
or might lead to such restraint if not stopped in its incipient stages. 4
The several laws under which the Federal Trade Commission,
the Department of Justice, and other agencies deal with monopo-
listic practices and restraints of trade and commerce state a broad
public policy of relying upon competition. To this end, the Sherman
Act 5" prohibited private contracts, combinations and conspiracies
in restraint of trade. The duty of executing that law was assigned
to the Department of Justice and the courts. The act left it to the
courts to define "restraint of trade." Experience of the first twenty
years after enactment of the Sherman Act convinced Congress that
court definition of unlawful restraints did not sufficiently cover all
the business practices which may result in undesirable injury to
competition. The Clayton Act'' supplements the Sherman Act by
cataloging certain specific practices, such as discriminations in
price, services, or facilities, tying or exclusive dealing contracts
and arrangements, intercorporate acquisitions, and interlocking
directorates, where they may adversely affect competition. The
Federal Trade Commission Act" prohibits all "unfair methods of
competition."
48. 1 DAvis § 1.05, at 34.
49. FTC v. Cement Institute, 383 U.S. 683, 692, 693 (1948).
50. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1952).
51. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1952).
52. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1952).
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The Federal Trade Commission Act and the antitrust laws are
parts of a comprehensive plan developed by Congress over a pe-
riod of many years to deal with monopolistic and trade restraining
practices in a rapidly expanding industrial economy of increasing
complexity. The many practices involved are too varied to be cov-
ered by a single or master law, or to be dealt with by only one
agency or method of enforcement. Congress wisely placed respon-
sibility for the accomplishment of the policy of these laws in both
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission and
thus provided "the government with cumulative remedies against
activity detrimental to competition."5
To commit to the courts (even specialized courts)," sole and
complete responsibility for antitrust enforcement would be to dis-
card the fully considered, studiously devised means developed
by Congress in 1914 to meet the antitrust problem and to lose the
basic features and special techniques carefully provided to insure
more effective enforcement.
The Federal Trade Commission has developed a special compe-
tence in the prevention of false and misleading advertising. The
trade court proposal would seriously impede and could possibly
destroy the operations of the Commission in this area. The preven-
tion of false and misleading advertising is much more suitably
adapted to administrative than to judicial handling. This is par-
ticularly true where the parties are willing to terminate the de-
ceptive act or practice without litigation. The vast majority of
false and misleading advertising cases before the Commission are
settled without litigation.
Professor Davis thoroughly disposes of the "separation of pow-
ers" argument for the proposed dismantling of the Federal Trade
Commission and other administrative bodies. He concludes that
"we have learned that danger of tyranny or injustice lurks in un-
checked power, not in blended power." 5 The separation of powers
argument is particularly inappropriate to the proposal to split up
the Federal Trade Commission's powers.
This argument proceeds: (1) good government requires that all
powers of government be divided into three branches: executive,
legislative, and judicial; (2) a number of administrative agencies,
including the Federal Trade Commission, exercise a combination
53. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948).
54. In 1910, in response to pressure from the American Bar Association, Congress
created a specialized Commerce Court. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 809, 36 Stat. 539.
Despite the specialization, the Commerce Court was reversed in ten of its twelve
decisions which were reviewed by the Supreme Court. Three years after its creation,
the Commerce Court was abolished. Act of Oct. 22, 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219.
55. 1 DAVIs § 1.09, at 74.
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of executive, legislative, and judicial powers; (3) a start can be
made toward unscrambling this improper mixture by transferring
the "judicial" powers of the Federal Trade Commission to a "court.'
The Federal Trade Commission Act declares unlawful "unfair
methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices."56 With certain exceptions, the statute does not define "un-
fair methods of competition" or "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices." Congress gave this task to the Commission. Each time that
the Commission issues an order to cease and desist under the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act, it is filling in the meaning of the
statute, as well as deciding a dispute over facts between the re-
spondent and the Bureau of Litigation. Although this departure
from the theory of separation of powers has been protested by
some as unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of the United States
has never found it so.
Whether or not the Constitution permits it, proponents of the
trade court say that this "impairment of the basic structure of
the national government"5 7 is an undesirable development, and we
should try to return "essentially judicial functions to the judiciary." 58
Even if we assume, for purposes of argument, no present validity
in the reasons of policy which motivated Congress to establish the
Federal Trade Commission in 1914 with the particular powers as-
signed to it, it is difficult to isolate the Commission's "essentially
judicial functions." Experts disagree. One group finds the issuance
of cease and desist orders to be a "judicial function"; " another finds
this a "mixed function"; 60 a third finds it "approaches closely the
legislative field."61 One distinguished group found that the only
properly "judicial function" of the Federal Trade Commission is its
duty to aid the federal courts in working out dissolution decrees."2
The American Bar Association proposal would transfer all the
Commission's cease and desist order authority under both the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and Clayton Acts to a trade court, to be
established under article III of the Constitution. To the extent
that such transfer includes the Commission's authority to define
"unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or
56. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5(a) (1), 66 Stat. 632 (1952), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1952).
57. COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF TIE GOVERNMENT,
TASSI FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SRVICES AND PRoCEDuRE 246 (1955).
58. Ibid.
59. Id. at 242, 245.
60. PRESIDENT's COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH SPECIAL
S~ruDEs 231 (1937).
61. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF ThE SPECIAL Co IaI. ON ADMINISTRA-
TrVE LAW 238 (1936).
62. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, Op. cit. s-upra note
60, at 230-81. See also Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935).
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practices," it could be argued this might be an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power to the judicial branch of the gov-
ernment, in violation of the very doctrine which the transfer is
supposed to strengthen. 63
Regardless of such legal niceties, the practical reason behind
the doctrine of separation of powers is that it is wise to prevent
any one man or group of men from becoming so powerful that they
can dominate, rather than represent, the American people. Where
this reason does not apply, neither should the doctrine. The danger
to be avoided is one of unchecked power, not combination in
one government agency of functions different in legal concept
There is little danger that the Federal Trade Commission, through
its power to issue cease and desist orders subject to judicial re-
view will be able to dominate and control the entire government,
or any part of it.
Professor Davis has made a great contribution by destroying
completely the arguments advanced by proponents of the trade
court. He refutes them explicitly in the early sections of volume I
and he refutes them implicitly throughout the entire Treatise.
"All in all," Professor Davis concludes, "the political outlook is
for a long-term continued growth of the administrative process.
Few informed people of any political persuasion are likely to dis-
agree with a 1955 statement by the Attorney General for the most
conservative national administration we have had since 1933: 'Ad-
ministrative agencies have become an established part of our con-
stitutional government, accepted by Congress, the judiciary and
the people as an essential part of the governmental structure. They
were created as a necessary means for protecting public interests
which could not be suitably protected by the courts or other
means.... Administrative agencies must be enabled and permitted
to function efficiently and effectively if the public interest, which is
their primary concern, is to be preserved."' 64
63. See Comment, The Distinction Between Legislative and Constitutional Courts,
43 YALE L.J. 316 (1933).
64. 1 DAvis § 1.05, at 44.
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